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OBSCENITY DECISIONS BASED ON PROCEDURAL
MECHANISMS ARE PATENTLY OFFENSIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
The obscenity doctrine was born on a cold night in old England
when a naked man perched himself on a balcony railing and showered
onlookers below with bottles of his own urine.' His act was quickly la-
belled "obscene" by the Common Law Courts. This event served as a
legal baptism for a complex doctrine which would plague American
courts for many years to follow.
The first amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
freedom of speech to state citizens through the fourteenth amendment.2
The first amendment, however, does not provide an unlimited right. In
Roth v. United States, I the Supreme Court determined that obscenity
was not within the scope of protected speech. Consequently, any speech
identified as "obscene" can be silenced.
In Gascoe, Ltd. v. Newtown Township, ' ("Gascoe"), a Pennsylvania
district court stated that it would go beyond the chain of Supreme Court
cases dealing with the zoning of pornography.5 The actual focal point of
the case was a local obscenity ordinance. The Gascoe court found the
ordinance unconstitutional because it failed to provide procedural safe-
guards for determining whether the questioned speech was protected by
the first amendment or obscene based on local community standards.6
However, the court failed to consider in its analysis the substantive im-
pact of the obscenity ordinance on protected speech, and whether the
ordinance's definition of obscenity violated standards established by the
Supreme Court for defining obscenity.
II. FACTS
In Gascoe, 7 a Pennsylvania corporation, ("Gascoe Ltd."), entered
1. Sir Charles Sydlyes Case, 1 Keble 620 (K.B. 1663).
2. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
3. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
4. 699 F. Supp. 1092 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
5. Id. The court sought to determine: "[W]hether a municipality may, consistent with
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, use its zoning power to prohibit entirely the distribu-
tion of adult films within its jurisdiction." Id.
6. Id. at 1099.
7. Id. at 1092.
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into a lease agreement with Newtown Village Partnership to open a video
store in a Bucks County, Pennsylvania shopping center. Gascoe Ltd.
sought to obtain a conditional use permit s prior to the store's opening in
compliance with the Newtown Zoning and Planning Ordinance.9 This
process required obtaining approval from both the Township Planning
Commission and the Board of Supervisors. Gascoe Ltd. received ap-
proval from the Planning Commission, but the Board denied the applica-
tion because the video store intended to carry X-rated films in addition to
its family-oriented selections.' ° The Board based its action on Section
1301(B) of the Township Joint Municipal Zoning Ordinance, which
made it illegal to grant conditional use permits for any business deemed
detrimental to the community."I According to the Board, distribution of
X-rated films did not satisfy the standards set forth in the ordinance and
would be detrimental to the community. 2
The Board believed that permitting the rental and sale of X-rated
films in a shopping center would degrade the surrounding community.
The Township Solicitor furthered this argument by stating that the sale
and/or rental of X-rated films in a shopping center frequented by the
general public would do nothing to maintain or improve the commu-
nity's general welfare.' 3 Given these arguments, the Board tentatively
approved Gascoe Ltd.'s application on the condition that the store re-
frain from renting and/or selling any X-rated films."
Gascoe Ltd. reapplied for a conditional use permit, hoping to reas-
sure the Board that issuance of the proposed permit would not jeopardize
the general welfare of the community. ' Gascoe Ltd. produced previous
lease agreements from its other stores to illustrate the new store's pro-
posed rental procedures. In its other stores, Gascoe Ltd. had segregated
the adult-oriented material in a small, isolated area in the back of the
8. The Township required businesses to obtain a "conditional use permit" prior to com-
mencing business operations. This requirement was akin to a licensing procedure for operating
a business. The granting of the permit was subject to a determination that the "improvement
[for which the applicant seeks approval] . . . [is] not . . . a detriment to ... property in the
immediate vicinity and [is] in the best interests of the municipality .... " Brief in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4, Gascoe (No. 88-7131).
9. Gascoe, 699 F. Supp. at 1093.
10. Id.
11. Id. Section 1301(B) of the Newtown Township Zoning Ordinance describes an "ac-
ceptable business" as follows: "An improvement which shall not be a detriment to the prop-
erty in the immediate vicinity and which shall be in the best interests of the municipality, the
benefit of the community and the public welfare." Id.
12. Id.





store. The X-rated films could not be observed by the general public, and
Gascoe Ltd. did not advertise their availability.' 6 Furthermore, Gascoe
Ltd. implemented age restrictions for both the customers renting the X-
rated films and the employees handling the films.'" Despite Gascoe
Ltd.'s efforts, its application for a conditional use permit was again de-
nied.'I This time the Board based their denial on the Newtown Town-
ship Obscenity Ordinance ("Ordinance"),' 9 under which the X-rated
films were found obscene and thus unprotected as speech under the first
amendment. Gascoe Ltd. appealed.20
Gascoe Ltd. filed a complaint with the Eastern District Court of
Pennsylvania, alleging that the Board's repeated refusal to issue the per-
mit was an unconstitutional prior restraint 2' on Gascoe Ltd.'s right to
free speech under the first amendment.22 Gascoe Ltd. based its claim on
the case law interpreting the first amendment. 23 Gascoe Ltd. argued that
these cases recognized a strong presumption against suppressing speech
prior to a judicial determination that such speech was not protected
under the first amendment. 24 Additionally, a prompt hearing had to be
provided after imposition of a prior restraint in order to determine
whether the speech at issue was to be afforded protection under the first
amendment as "protected speech" or whether it was "unprotected
speech," such as obscenity, which could be restricted.25
The films in question were never screened prior to the Board's denial
of the use permit nor was a subsequent hearing provided.26 Based on
these facts, the district court reasoned that the Ordinance's failure to al-
low for a prompt judicial review after denying Gascoe Ltd.'s right to free
speech violated the prior restraint doctrine.27 Consequently, the court
concluded that the Ordinance violated constitutional safeguards against
16. Id. at 1093 n.1.
17. Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, Gascoe (No. 88-
7131).
18. Gascoe, 699 F. Supp. at 1094.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1097 (quoting Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965)).
21. Prior restraints may be placed on speech for a limited time until the speech is deter-
mined to be either "obscene" or "protected" through judicial review. Applying prior re-
straints for an indefinite period, without judicial review, violates the constitutional promptness
standard put forth by the Supreme Court in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
22. Gascoe, 699 F. Supp. at 1094.
23. Id. at 1095.
24. Id. at 1097. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-34, at 1040
(1988).
25. Gascoe, 699 F. Supp. at 1097 (quoting Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965)).
26. Id. at 1098-99.
27. Id. at 1099.
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infringing upon protected speech and was unconstitutional both on its
face and as applied.28
III. THE GASCOE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In evaluating the Township's actions, the Gascoe court initially fo-
cused on the local zoning ordinance to determine whether it met current
constitutional requirements.29 The court applied the requisite standards
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Young v. American Mini
Theatres, 30 ("Young"), and later upheld by City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 31 ("Renton"). In Young, the Supreme Court upheld a
zoning ordinance which limited the licensing of adult theaters to areas
not within 1,000 feet of other regulated forms of adult entertainment nor
within 500 feet of a residential area.32 Likewise, the Court in Renton
upheld a zoning ordinance that prohibited the location of adult theaters
within 1,000 feet of residential dwellings, churches, or parks and within
one mile of schools.33 The purpose behind both the Young and the Ren-
ton ordinances was to protect the community from the secondary effects
that adult theaters were likely to produce. The Court pointed to in-
creased crime rates and moral deterioration of the community as some of
the secondary effects likely to occur when pornographic businesses were
concentrated in certain areas.34 The Supreme Court's conclusion in both
of these cases was that the zoning ordinances at issue were acceptable
because they promoted "substantial governmental interests"35 without
banning these potentially protected forms of speech from an entire city.36
Although the Gascoe court initially focused upon the Township's
zoning ordinance, it failed to draw any conclusions based upon its analy-
sis of the zoning ordinance alone. Instead, the court maintained that
the Township's zoning ordinance, when used in conjunction with the lo-
cal obscenity ordinance, resulted in an unconstitutional regulatory
scheme.3 7 The Gascoe court likened the Township's regulatory scheme
28. Id. "On its face" refers to the text of the ordinance, whereas "as applied" refers to the
way in which the Supervisors enforced the ordinance. The district court found the ordinance
lacking in both of these respects. Id. at 1099.
29. Id. at 1095-97.
30. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
31. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
32. Young, 427 U.S. at 52.
33. Renton, 475 U.S. at 44.
34. Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.34; Renton, 475 U.S. at 48.
35. Renton, 475 U.S. at 41; Young, 427 U.S. at 72.
36. Gascoe, 699 F. Supp. at 1095 (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,
47).
37. Id. at 1096.
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to those found constitutionally unacceptable in Schad v. Borough of
Mount Ephraim, 38 ("Schad"), and Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 9
("Erznoznik").
In Schad, the Supreme Court declared invalid a zoning ordinance
which completely excluded live entertainment, including nude dancing,
in the New Jersey town of Mount Ephraim.' The Court struck down
the ordinance because its dual purposes of catering only to residents' im-
mediate needs4 and avoiding problems associated with live entertain-
ment,42 were not government interests sufficiently substantial to warrant
the banning of all live entertainment.43 Similarly, the Erznoznik Court
declared unconstitutional an ordinance making it a public nuisance and a
punishable offense for a drive-in movie theater to exhibit films containing
nudity, when the screen was visible from a public street.' Like Schad,
the Erznoznik statute was struck down because it singled out a particular
form of speech for punishment without providing a sufficient governmen-
tal interest to justify such punishment.4" The ordinances in Schad and
Erznoznik placed too broad a burden on constitutionally protected
speech because the ordinances were all inclusive in nature, banning,
rather than regulating protected speech.46
The Gascoe court focused on the decisions in Young, Renton, Schad,
and Erznoznik as support for the proposition that all inclusive regulatory
schemes are unconstitutional.47 In accordance with precedent, the
Gascoe court declared the Township's regulatory scheme unconstitu-
tional because it banned all X-rated films from the locality.4 After
reaching this conclusion, the Gascoe court reviewed the ordinances in
light of the prior restraint doctrine, which was ultimately identified as the
source of the shortcoming in the Township's regulatory scheme:
By using the zoning permit requirements of section 1301(B) in
conjunction with the township's obscenity ordinance, the Board
38. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
39. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
40. 452 U.S. at 65.
41. Id. at 72.
42. Id. at 73.
43. Id. at 74-75.
44. 422 U.S. at 206-07.
45. Id. at 217-18. "We hold only that the present ordinance does not satisfy the rigorous
constitutional standards that apply when government attempts to regulate expression. Where
First Amendment freedoms are at stake we have repeatedly emphasized that precision of draft-
ing and clarity of purpose are essential."
46. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 213; Schad, 452 U.S. at 77.
47. Gascoe, 699 F. Supp. at 1096.
48. Id. at 1097.
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has taken a blunderbuss [shot gun] approach to the regulation
of films in Newtown Township and effectively placed an uncon-
stitutional prior restraint on [Gascoe's] right to distribute pro-
tected films.49
The Gascoe court supported its finding that the Township's regula-
tory scheme was unconstitutional by reasoning that the requisite safe-
guards to be employed when imposing a prior restraint on speech were
absent from the regulatory scheme." The Gascoe court cited Freedman
v. Maryland, 51 ("Freedman"), in support of its decision. Freedman in-
volved an appellant who was convicted for exhibiting a sexually explicit
motion picture in a Baltimore theater without submitting it to a
Maryland censorship board prior to distribution. 2 The United States
Supreme Court reversed Freedman's conviction, declaring that the
Maryland rule53 was void because it failed to provide a procedural mech-
anism which could determine whether a film was constitutionally pro-
tected prior to its being shown in the community, or shortly thereafter. 4
Freedman enumerated the following safeguards which must be applied
when imposing prior restraints on speech:
(1) the censor must bear the burden of proving that the film is
unprotected speech under the First Amendment;
(2) any restraint prior to judicial review must be limited to
preservation of the status quo and for the shortest period com-
patible with sound judicial procedure; and
(3) a prompt final judicial determination of obscenity must be
made.55
Citing the Freedman requirements, the Gascoe court reasoned that
the Township's regulatory scheme was lacking in two respects. First, the
restraint of speech was not limited to a brief period of time. 6 Second,
the regulatory plan did not allow for a prompt judicial determination of
whether the speech was protected by the first amendment." 7 Given these
problems, the Gascoe court concluded that the regulatory scheme vio-
lated the prior restraint provisions delineated in Freedman: as such, the
49. Id. at 1096.
50. Id.
51. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
52. Id. at 52.
53. Id. See MD. CODE ANN. Art. 66A § 2 (1957).
54. 380 U.S. at 60.
55. Gascoe, 699 F. Supp. at 1097 (quoting Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59
(1965)).




regulatory scheme was an unconstitutional restriction on protected
speech.
58
After the zoning and obscenity ordinances were evaluated as a single
regulatory scheme, the Gascoe court narrowed its focus to analyze the
obscenity ordinance alone.59 The court dismissed the zoning ordinance
from consideration because it found that the Board's "interpretation" of
the zoning ordinance was deficient, not the content which complied with
constitutional standards.' Conversely, the court found the obscenity or-
dinance lacking in its content and warranted further analysis.
6 '
The Township's obscenity ordinance was modeled after the Penn-
sylvania Obscenity Ordinance,62 which incorporated the United States
Supreme Court's definition of obscenity as explained in Miller v. Califor-
nia, 63 ("Miller"). In Miller, the appellant was convicted for mailing un-
solicited sexually explicit books.6' This activity violated a California
statute prohibiting the knowing distribution of obscene material.65 In
upholding the statute, the Miller Court provided the current standard
for defining obscenity:
a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest;
b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offen-
sive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law; and
c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.
66
The Miller Court intentionally failed to define what constituted "pa-
tently offensive" for the purposes of the standard, stating that the task of
defining "patently offensive" was reserved for the states.6 7 Accordingly,
the Township supplied its own definition of "patently offensive":
"Patently offensive," means conduct so offensive on its face as
to affront current standards of decency, and shall be deemed to
include any of the following described forms of sexual conduct,
58. Id. at 1099.
59. Id. at 1098.
60. Id.
61. Gascoe, 699 F. Supp. at 1099.
62. PENNSYLVANIA OBSCENITY ACT, 18 PA. CONST. STAT. § 5903 (Purdon 1983).
63. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
64. Id. at 18.
65. Id. at 16.
66. Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 25.
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if they are depicted so as to affront current standards of
decency:
a.) An act of sexual intercourse, normal or perverted, actual
or simulated, real or animated, including genital-genital, anal-
genital or oral-genital intercourse, whether between human be-
ings or between a human being and an animal.
b.) Sadomasochistic abuse meaning flagellation or torture or
sexual gratification, by or upon a person who is nude or clad in
under-garments or in a revealing costume, or the condition or
[sic] being fettered, bound or otherwise physically restrained on
the part of the one so clothed.
c.) Masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of
the genitals, including any explicit close-up representation of a
human genital organ or spread-eagle exposure of female genital
organs.
d.) Physical contact or simulated physical contact with the
clothed or naked pubic area or buttocks of a human male or
female, or the breasts of the female, whether alone or between
members of the same or opposite sex, or between humans and
animals in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or
gratification.
e.) Fellatio, cunnilingus, anal sodomy, seminal ejaculation, or
any excretory function.6"
Applying a Miller analysis, the Gascoe court did not cite any short-
comings in the obscenity ordinance's definition of "patently offensive."6 9
However, the court did find that the Township's obscenity ordinance
failed to include certain procedural mechanisms required by Freedman,
and incorporated into the Pennsylvania Obscenity Ordinance.7° In par-
ticular, the Township's obscenity ordinance did not provide for a prompt
adversarial hearing in order to determine whether the X-rated films were
constitutionally protected speech following the Board's conclusion that
they were "obscene."7 " If the X-rated films were found to be obscene
during the hearing, then constitutional protection would not be af-
forded.72 Since the obscenity ordinance did not provide for this essential
68. 699 F. Supp at 1094 n.2.
69. Id. at 1099. The Gascoe court voluntarily elected to bypass consideration of the sub-
stantive aspects of the obscenity ordinance because it claimed that this was an issue which
should be left to the states. Id.
70. 18 PA. CONST. STAT. § 5903(g) (Purdon 1983).
71. Gascoe, 699 F. Supp. at 1098-99.




hearing, the court declared the ordinance unconstitutional both on its
face and as applied."
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW SURROUNDING THE GASCOE
COURT'S ANALYSIS
An overview of the development and impact of prior restraint and
obscenity doctrines is essential to the Gascoe court's finding.
A. Prior Restraint
As previously stated, there is a strong presumption against re-
straining speech prior to a court's determination of whether it is pro-
tected by the first amendment.74 This presumption was first articulated
by the United States Supreme Court in Near v. Minnesota, " ("Near"),
which banned prior restraint of the press except under extreme circum-
stances.76 The Near Court struck down a state statute which permitted
censorship of any defamatory newspaper after the statute was used to
permanently enjoin a publication that criticized local officials."
Despite the historic reluctance to impose prior restraints on expres-
sion, the United States Supreme Court has allowed this form of censor-
ship in cases which it deems "exceptional." 78 Prior restraints have been
upheld under the following circumstances: "film licensing;7 9 commercial
advertising; ° and permit requirements to use public places for expressive
activities."8 " Even when prior restraints on speech are applied, speech
73. Gascoe, 699 F. Supp. at 1099.
74. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 716. In dictum, Chief Justice Hughes provided several examples of exceptional
cases: "1) restraints during wartime to prevent the disclosure of military deployments or ob-
struction of the military effort; 2) enforcement of obscenity laws; and 3) enforcement of laws
against incitement to acts of violence or revolution. Id.
77. Id. at 722-23.
78. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-36, at 1045 (1988).
79. See, e.g., Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961). Film licensing require-
ments will not be struck down simply on the grounds that they in fact constitute a prior
restraint.
80. See, e.g., Posados de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, 478
U.S. 328 (1986). The Court held that Puerto Rico could curtail casino advertising focused at
its own citizens by imposing specific regulations to that end. The Court reasoned that the
legislature's power to ban certain activities entirely, such as gambling, meant that they had the
lesser included power of banning any advertising related to those activities subject to legislative
regulation. Id. at 345-46.
81. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). A municipal ordinance requir-
ing permits for all public meetings and parades was permitted when it was enacted in conjunc-
tion with a state statute which required hearings for such requests.
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cannot permanently be withheld from the public without some judicial
determination that it is not "protected speech" under the first amend-
ment. 2 As established by the Freedman Court, 3 rigid safeguards must
be adhered to when applying such restraints.
In particular, Freedman requires that any statute imposing a prior
restraint must contain a procedural mechanism for determining
promptly whether such speech is protected by the first amendment. 4
The rationale behind the Freedman measures is to prevent constitution-
ally protected speech from being silenced before it enters the marketplace
of ideas: "Without these safeguards, it [might] prove too burdensome to
seek review of the censor's determination."" As stated in Freedman, "in
the case of motion pictures, it may take very little to deter exhibition in a
given locality. The exhibitor's stake in any one picture may be insuffi-
cient to warrant a protracted and onerous course of litigation."86 Freed-
man also points out that only a handful of states employ such censorship
laws so that the exhibitor may simply choose to show his film in other
areas of the country rather than become involved in litigation. 7 Gascoe
Ltd., on the other hand, was not deterred from pursuing litigation by the
absence of the Freedman requirements because the existence of its entire
business was at stake, rather than merely the fate of a single film.
B. Obscenity
Although rules had been drafted limiting the distribution of obscen-
ity,"8 American courts rarely attempted to define what constituted ob-
scenity prior to the late nineteenth century. Early American cases
handling this issue deferred to the English Common Law for an appro-
priate obscenity test. 89 The approach most often followed by American
courts in the late 1800's was that put forth in Regina v. Hicklin, 9'
("Hicklin "). The Hicklin case formulated the following test for defining
obscenity: whether the work, as a whole or in any portion, would tend to
82. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
83. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
84. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58.
85. Id. at 59.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 5 Stat. 566 (1842), in which Vermont prohibited importation of obscene pictures and
postcards; 7 New York Stats. 309 (1868), in which New York made a move to prohibit obscen-
ity; 17 Stat. 599 (1873), in which Congress declared it a criminal offense to send obscene
material through the mails.
89. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-16, at 906 (1988). See also Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1957).
90. 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868).
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inflame persons particularly susceptible to immoral influences. 9' This
subjective test imposed a strict standard for gauging obscenity in which
any potentially arousing passage might render an entire work
"obscene." 9 2
In American courts, the Hicklin test remained a popular means of
determining obscenity for many years. 93 During the early to mid-twenti-
eth century, support for Hicklin began to wane 94 because most contem-
porary literature was declared obscene under this subjective test.95 By
the late 1950's, Hicklin had been laid to rest.96
Hicklin's successor was Roth v. United States, " ("Roth"). Roth
posed a novel question:98 whether obscenity was within the realm of con-
stitutionally protected speech.99 The United States Supreme Court read-
ily decided that obscenity was not protected by the first amendment but
the crucial consideration for the Roth Court was the development of an
appropriate test for establishing what constitutes "obscene speech" as op-
posed to "protected speech."'"
The Roth test was distinguishable from the Hicklin test in three dis-
tinct ways. First, Roth broadened the standard of review to embrace the
values of the "average person" rather than applying the narrow focus on
individuals "susceptible to immoral influences."'' Second, Roth evalu-
ated works as a whole rather than reaching conclusions based on "iso-
91. Id. at 368.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., United States v. Clarke, 38 F. 500 (1889); McFadden v. United States, 165 F.
51 (1908); United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119 (1913); Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass.
318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930); Commonwealth v. Delacey, 271 Mass. 327, 171 N.E. 455 (1930).
94. See United States v. One Book Called Ulysses, 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd,
72 F.2d 705 (1934). This case suggested that the standard for determining obscenity should be
based on the average person rather than on those who are especially susceptible to arousal.
95. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930), in which
Theodore Dreiser's An American Tragedy was declared obscene. See also Commonwealth v.
Delacey, 271 Mass. 327, 171 N.E. 455 (1930), in which D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's
Lover was also declared obscene under the Hicklin test.
96. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). "The early leading standard of obscenity
allowed material to be judged merely by the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly
susceptible persons (citing Regina v. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868)). Some American courts
adopted this standard but later decisions have rejected it." Id. at 488-89.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 481. Although no prior decision based its conclusion on the premise that ob-
scenity was outside the scope of protected speech, the Supreme Court had previously assumed
that obscenity was not covered by the first amendment.
99. Id. at 485.
100. Id. at 488-89. "It is vital that the standards for judging obscenity safeguard the protec-
tion of freedom of speech and press ....
101. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 489.
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lated passages."102 Finally, Roth interpreted the first amendment as
protecting all speech which had even the slightest redeeming social value,
so that only those works utterly lacking in social importance were
deemed obscene. 103
The test articulated in Roth was later revised in part by the United
States Supreme Court in Miller. "0 The Miller decision altered the ob-
scenity doctrine in several ways by building upon the Roth factors. The
Miller Court broadened the scope of the obscenity inquiry to include not
only works that utterly lacked redeeming social value,1 °5 but also those
works which "lack[ed] serious . . . value."10 6 This broader scope of
works which could be determined obscene resulted in fewer works being
protected under the first amendment. 0 7 Additionally, Miller added to
the obscenity test the term "patently offensive," which was to "be deter-
mined by applicable state law."'0° This new prong of the test enabled
state legislatures to devise their own standard of what was "patently of-
fensive," thereby avoiding the imposition of a national standard."°9
Miller empowered the states with the ability to define obscenity for
themselves but this power was not absolute. The Miller case restricted
state application of obscenity ordinances to "hard core" pornography: 1 0
"Under the holding announced today, no one will be subject to prosecu-
tion for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials
depict or describe patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct .... ""
The intention behind this limitation was to place parties on notice that
this form of speech ("hard core" pornography) was subject to regula-
102. Id.
The Hicklin test, judging obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon the most
susceptible persons, might well encompass material legitimately treating ... sex, and
so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and
press. On the other hand, the substituted standard provides safeguards adequate to
withstand the charge of constitutional infirmity.
Id. at 489. See also One Book Called Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705, 708 in which the Hicklin test was
criticized for its subjectivity.
103. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
104. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text
for a further discussion of Miller.
105. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
106. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
107. Id. at 25 n.7 ("A quotation from Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book will not constitution-
ally redeem an otherwise obscene publication.... ") (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229,
231 (1972)).
108. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
109. Id. at 30.




tion. I2 However, applying this standard often proves problematic for
local legislators, who must determine what constitutes "hard core" por-
nography in drafting legislation. For example, in Gascoe, the Township's
obscenity ordinance defined "hard core" pornography so broadly in its
definition of "patently offensive" that the ordinance failed to effectively
place parties on notice of what types of speech were or were not subject
to regulation.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S APPROACH
The Township's obscenity ordinance was discussed only briefly by
the court, yet the court's decision was based almost exclusively on the
procedural aspects of the obscenity ordinance." 3 A more detailed analy-
sis of the obscenity ordinance would have revealed a greater problem
inherent within the ordinance's definition of what is considered "patently
offensive." Instead, this problem escaped judicial review, thereby provid-
ing the Township with an opportunity to reinstate the ordinance simply
by adding the missing procedural mechanism.
The Gascoe court concluded that the obscenity ordinance was un-
constitutional because it failed to provide for a prompt adversarial hear-
ing to determine obscenity.' " 4 Based on Freedman, failure to provide a
prompt hearing within a reasonable time violates the doctrine of prior
restraint 1 5 and has a chilling effect on potentially protected speech."
6
Thus, the Gascoe court's finding on this issue was technically accurate.
However, its decision highlights a frequent problem in judicial analyses
of obscenity ordinances. Courts use the procedural mechanism of the
prior restraint doctrine as a quick way of remedying obscenity ordi-
nances when those ordinances should command a more thorough review.
For example, the Gascoe court held the Township's obscenity ordinance
unconstitutional based on its procedural shortcomings, instead of engag-
ing in a thorough analysis of the ordinance's substance. Such an analysis
would have revealed the ordinance's overly broad definition of "patently
offensive."
Courts frequently base their conclusions on procedural mechanisms
rather than analyzing the particular statute's substance for possible
shortcomings. In Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., "' ("Vance"), the
112. Id.
113. 699 F. Supp. at 1099.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1098-99.
116. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 61 (1965).
117. 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
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United States Supreme Court evaluated a public nuisance statute which
allowed a judge to enjoin a theater from showing future films if the thea-
ter's prior showings had included obscene films. The ordinance granted
the judge this power without providing the Freedman safeguards for the
future films involved. The Vance Court declared the statute unconstitu-
tional based solely on its violation of the prior restraint doctrine rather
than considering the statute's substantive problems.'
The Vance decision generated criticism by scholars who labelled the
Court's analysis as being "too simple."' 9 The basic shortcoming cited in
these criticisms was that the Supreme Court never considered the sub-
stantive effects of the obscenity statutes involved.'20 For example, the
Vance Court never considered the potential chilling effect that such an
obscenity-nuisance statute would have on individuals, who might now
engage in excessive self-censorship to avoid an injunction. 12 1 Thus, po-
tentially "protected speech" would be self-suppressed without ever being
declared obscene. This discourages the free flow of ideas which is re-
quired under the Constitution."2 2
Like the Vance Court, Gascoe applied a superficial analysis to the
ordinance at issue. The Gascoe court should have considered the content
of the Township's obscenity ordinance and the chilling effect it might
have had on free speech in the community. Because of the ordinance's
provisions, many video store owners may now refrain from carrying even
R-rated films, fearing that they might face a lawsuit, revocation of their
license, or an initial refusal for a conditional use permit to engage in
business. This would result in chilling the availability of videos, and thus
constrict the free flow and availability of ideas in the marketplace. Con-
cern for potentially chilling speech is especially relevant in Gascoe be-
cause the substance of the Township's obscenity ordinance is overly
broad in scope.
As put forth in Miller, states, as well as townships, have the freedom
to draft their own definition of "patently offensive" in their obscenity
118. Id. at 317.
119. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-36, at 1049 (1988). See also Note,




122. U.S. CONST. amend. 1: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech ...." See also Freedman, 380 U.S. at 57 ("[U]nder the Fourteenth Amendment, a
State is not free to adopt whatever procedures it pleases for dealing with obscenity... without
regard to possible consequences for constitutionally protected speech.") (quoting Marcus v.
Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731 (1961)).
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ordinances. 123 However, such local definitions are subject to limitation.
It is particularly relevant that the Miller opinion limits the definition of
"patently offensive" to "hard core" sexual conduct. 24 The Township's
ordinance does not adhere to this specification. Because the Township's
ordinance defines "patently offensive" to include acts which might be
found in a PG movie rather than in "hard core" pornography, it should
fail under the "hard core" sexual conduct requirement announced in
Miller.
For example, the Township's ordinance considers contact with
"clothed breasts and buttocks" as potentially "patently offensive." '125
Accordingly, even a passionate hug is not above reproach under the
Township's community standard. Gascoe's definition of what constitutes
"'patently offensive" is broader than what the United States Supreme
Court announced as acceptable under Miller. 126
The Gascoe court's decision, like that of the Court in Vance, pro-
motes the likelihood that protected speech might be suppressed before it
enters the marketplace of ideas. In response to the Gascoe opinion, the
Township may reinstate the same impermissibly broad obscenity ordi-
nance by simply adding the required procedural safeguard. However,
the hearing provided by Freedman, to determine whether an X-rated film
is obscene under the Township's ordinance, is not sufficient because the
community standard applied under the Township's ordinance is overly
broad.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Gascoe court's final conclusion that the Newtown Township
Obscenity Ordinance was unconstitutional is a technically correct deci-
sion; however, the route chosen by the court in reaching its conclusion
presents future problems. Determining the validity of the substance of
the Township's ordinance constitutes a more effective long-term judicial
policy than invalidating the obscenity ordinance based on the prior re-
straint doctrine. The fact that the ordinance is amendable by the Town-
ship's Board of Supervisors, and that it could simply include the
procedural mechanism without changing the substance of the ordinance,
promotes the reinstatement of an impermissibly broad ordinance. That
amended ordinance will still place an undue burden on otherwise consti-
tutionally protected speech.
123. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973).
124. Id. at 27.
125. Gascoe, 699 F. Supp. at 1094 n.2(d).
126. Miller, 413 U.S. at 27.
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The Gascoe court stated that "the Board may not attribute obscenity
to a film based solely on non-deviate sexual content or an X-rating from
the Motion Picture Association of America." '127 However, the court
failed to take the further step of concluding that the obscenity ordi-
nance's definition of "patently offensive" was overly broad. Superficial
decisions such as this place a greater burden on already crowded court
dockets and tax our limited judicial resources by spawning unnecessary
litigation. Why should courts decide twice what could have been decided
once by an informed application of the law? Even more serious is that
such an opinion creates an impermissibly broad ordinance which will
chill "protected speech," and in some cases discourage necessary litiga-
tion. In the final analysis, the Gascoe decision merely applied a judicial
bandage to a larger wound which will not be healed by such superficial
measures.
Denise Z Kabakow*
127. 699 F. Supp. at 1096.
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